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Cochran: Legal Ethics and Collaborative Practice Ethics

LEGAL ETHICS AND COLLABORATIVE
PRACTICE ETHICS
Robert F. Cochran, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Collaborative Practice ("CP") is an important new process for the
resolution of legal disputes. It emerged in the early 1990s as a response
by legal, financial, and mental health professionals who had grave
concerns about the impact of traditional divorce practice on the family.
CP is still most frequently used in the family law area, but can be
applied to any substantive area of law in which the parties want to reach
a mutually beneficial settlement and avoid litigation. It has the potential
to transform law practice at a time when law practice is in need of
transformation.
In CP, the clients and their attorneys (and other professionals in the
case, if any) contract to resolve the issues presented in a structured
process without litigation. Both sets of clients and lawyers agree to:
* Negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement without having
courts decide issues;
* Maintain open communication and information sharing;
and
* Create shared solutions, acknowledging the highest
priorities of all affected persons.
In addition, they agree that the lawyers (and other professionals, if any)
will withdraw from the case if the matter proceeds to contested
litigation.
Lawyers who engage in CP are governed by the legal professional
rules in their state. However, CP differs greatly from traditional
adversarial practice. It challenges lawyers and other professionals in
ways not necessarily addressed by the ethics of their disciplines.
Therefore, collaborative professionals have developed additional
standards to provide guidance for their members.
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This Article describes the legal and ethical standards under which
professionals engage in CP in the United States. It considers the ethics of
CP under the American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rules of
Professional Conduct' (the most common set of ethical rules governing
the legal profession) and under the International Association of
Collaborative Professionals'
("IACP") Ethical Standards for
Collaborative Practitioners 2 (the most common set of ethical guidelines
for collaborative professionals). Both sets of rules set standards for client
autonomy, competence, diligence, confidentiality, candor, and loyalty.
Part II provides an introduction to CP. Part III evaluates CP in light
of the ABA and IACP ethical standards. It provides guidance to CP
lawyers as to how they might comply with both sets of guidelines. In
addition, it considers other ABA Model Rules that might impact CP.
This examination demonstrates that CP falls squarely within the ethical
behavior parameters for lawyers.
II.

AN INTRODUCTION TO COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE

CP arose as a response to several factors. In part, it was a response
to the increasingly litigious and adversarial nature of legal cases in the
early 1990s.3 Litigation in general became more costly, complex, and
* Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law and Director of the Herbert and Elinor Nootbaar
Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics. This Article was supported by a grant from the International
Academy of Collaborative Professionals. I would like to thank Nancy Cameron, Diane Diel, David
Hoffman, Talia Katz, John Lande, and Pauline Tesler for their suggestions. I would also like to
thank Jeff Hassler, Kelsey Stapler, and Jeff Wyss for their assistance in research.
1. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2009).
2. See generally ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR COLLABORATIVE PRACTITIONERS (IACP 2008),
available at http://www.collaborativepractice.com/lib/Ethics/Ethical%20Standards%20Jan%20%

2008.pdf [hereinafter ES]. For additional information about IACP, see infra notes 37-40 and
accompanying text.
3. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 52-53 (1994); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE
LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 316-17, 319-22 (1993); WALTER K.
OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE
LAWSUIT 23-25, 48-49, 56-58 (1991); see also THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND
LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 4 (2002) ("[C]omparative
research has shown that the United States relies more than any other nation on lawyers, rights, and
courts to address social issues.").
In 1960 there was one lawyer for every 627 people in the United States. By 1995 the
ratio had doubled to 1:307. Between 1960 and 1987, expenditures on lawyers in the
United States grew sixfold, from $9 billion annually to $54 billion (in constant 1983

dollars), almost tripling the share of GNP consumed by legal services.... Medical
malpractice suits, rare in 1960, reached 4.3 per 100 insured physicians in 1970 and 18.3
per 100 in 1986.
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 36-37 (2001)
(citations omitted). Former federal judge Marvin E. Frankel has said:
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time-consuming, and court dockets became backed up. Mediation, which
was initially a response to the adversarial nature of litigation became
more adversarial.4 A 1992 study, commissioned by the ABA, found that
the reputation of the bar had plummeted to new depths.5 The ABA
President cast the problem in public relations terms: "[W]e should view
[the study's] findings as a challenge for us to reach out to the public and
increase the public's understanding about the role of lawyers and the
wide range of valuable, but often overlooked public service activities we
perform." 6 But the study suggested that the problem was not the public's
lack of information about lawyers. Indeed, those who had the most
contact with lawyers had the lowest opinion of lawyers and those who
had learned what they knew about lawyers from watching televisions
had the highest opinion of lawyers. 7
The adversarial nature of litigation and other existing dispute
resolution mechanisms was particularly troubling in family law, the area
of CP's primary growth. There was a growing recognition that children
are collateral damage in many divorces, especially high conflict
divorces. 8 Family lawyers and parents9 sought a better way to resolve
disputes.
The discovery process itself, with rules that frequently are (or are made to be) intricate
and abstruse, becomes the occasion for expensive contests, producing libraries full of
opinions. Where the object always is to beat every plowshare into a sword, the discovery
procedure is employed variously as weaponry. A powerful litigant, in a complex case,
may impose costly, even crushing, burdens by demands for files, pretrial testimony of
witnesses, and other forms of discovery.
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 17-18 (1980).
4. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law ofADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3, 35-36 (1991).
5. See Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi: The Public Perception ofLawyers: ABA Poll, A.B.A.
J., Sept. 1993, at 60, 60, 65.
6. See R. William Ide III, What the ABA Plans to Do, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60, 65.
7. Id at 61.
8. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How
CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 35-38, 45-50 (1980); E. Mavis Hetherington et. al.,
Family Interaction and the Social, Emotional, and Cognitive Development of Children Following
Divorce 6-7 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Hofstra Law Review) (paper presented at the
Symposium on The family: Setting Priorities, May 1978); Doris S. Jacobson, The Impact ofMarital
Separation/Divorceon Children: II. InterparentHostility and ChildAdjustment, 2 J. DIVORCE 3, 17
(1978) (finding that interparent hostility after separation is destructive to children, and "the greater
the amount of interparent hostility, the greater the maladjustment of the child"). "The luckier
children watch helplessly from the sidelines as the legal process turns their parents into combatants;
the truly unlucky are enlisted as warriors by one or both parents in custody battles against the
other." Pauline H. Tesler, CollaborativeLaw: A New Paradigmfor Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 967, 971 n.13 (1999).

Despite a child's overriding need for conflict management, the prevalent adversarial
model of courtroom confrontation rewards parental conflict....
... Precisely when children need parents to lessen the degree of hostility and behave

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4

540

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:537

In addition, lawyers came to accept the notion of "unbundled" legal
services-providing less than the full range of legal services in
recognition that clients might not want or be able to afford all that a
lawyer might do.' 0 CP can be thought of as an example of unbundled
services-the lawyer does not provide litigation services-though the
primary justification for limiting the lawyers' services to the negotiation
of the dispute is the positive effect that such a limitation can have on the
negotiations.
Finally, CP can also be seen as another step in increased
specialization within law practice. CP lawyers focus on negotiation of
the dispute and leave litigation to other lawyers. Many CP lawyers are
willing to represent non-CP clients in litigation, but CP opens up the
possibility that a lawyer might only practice CP and develop a specialty
in interest-based negotiation.
CP differs dramatically from traditional legal dispute resolution. It
provides a structured process for the settlement of legal problems.
American lawyers have historically fallen into two categories-litigators
and transactional lawyers. CP addresses the cases traditionally handled
through adversarial negotiation and litigation in a more transactional
manner.
The CP provision requiring lawyers and other professionals to
withdraw if the parties do not reach settlement is the most important

cooperatively, the specter of courtroom combat-and especially the conflict over the
vague legal standard of the "best interests of the child"-encourages conflict....
... The adversarial process encourages parents to denigrate one another, rather than to
cooperate on the essential task of post-divorce child rearing. . . .The custody dispute also
drains resources from limited marital assets at a time when those assets could better be
used to preserve the family's standard of living.
Andrew Schepard, War and P.E.A.CE.: A Preliminary Report and a Model Statute on an
InterdisciplinaryEducational Programfor Divorcing and Separating Parents, 27 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 131, 145-47 (1993). One commentator has observed:
The litigation itself is often demeaning, as litigants attempt to exaggerate each other's
flaws and reopen old wounds in order to win points for themselves. Further, the process
is disempowering as it forces the parties to place their fates in the hands of their
attorneys and the court. In the process, the family's resources are expended and depleted
with no beneficial outcome for the child or the parents.
Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the Adversary
System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 133 (1997) (footnote omitted).
9. Three-fourths of parents who adopt collaborative law ("CL") do so because of concern for
their children. William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging
Practice,4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 378 (2004).
10. FORREST S. MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES: A GUIDE TO DELIVERING LEGAL
SERVICES A LA CARTE 1-4 (2000). Clients who use "unbundled" legal services may want to save

money or to be actively involved in handling their cases. Id. 3-4. They may merely want the lawyer
to give them advice, research, drafting assistance, negotiation assistance, a review of legal papers, or
a court appearance. Id. at 1.
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element distinguishing CP from other lawyer representation and
negotiation. It removes from lawyers the opportunity and temptation to
pursue the means of dispute resolution known best by most lawyers, the
one many have studied and honed their skills for throughout their
professional life: the trial. Moreover, in the CP process, teams of
professionals, including one or more mental health professionals and
financial specialists, may join the lawyers and clients in seeking to
resolve the dispute. All agree to work honestly and respectfully toward a
negotiated settlement as their sole purpose.
It is helpful to contrast CP with traditional pre-litigation
negotiation. Traditional legal representation generally yields a
settlement," but "it often involves contentious negotiations with
litigation looming in the background." 1 2 The term "litigotiation" has
been coined to denote negotiation in the shadow of litigation. 13 Cases
usually settle through the process of offers and counter-offers, often
combined with the escalation of time pressures as court dates approach.
Added to the time pressure are escalating transaction costs and the fear
that if the parties end up in court, a judge or jury will impose a "winnertake-all" solution. The danger in traditional negotiation is that much of
the parties' and lawyers' effort goes into preparing for litigation, and
negotiation is an afterthought. Pre-litigation posturing distorts the
negotiation process. Escalating negotiation strategies may lead to
increased conflict between the parties. Such representation can poison
the relationships between the parties and is unlikely to generate the best
11. The limited studies that have been done so far indicate that settlement rates for CP cases
are about the same as those of other processes. A 2003 study of 367 collaborative lawyers found an
overall settlement rate of 87.4%. Schwab, supra note 9, at 367, 375. Statistics assembled by IACP in
a current study continue to show a settlement rate of 86%. IACP, PRACTICE SURVEY: ALL CASES 7
(2009), https://www.collaborativepractice.com/lib/Surveys/IACPTtl.pdf. These rates are similar to
those found in studies of traditional negotiation and mediation. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For
and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L.
REv. 485, 488 n.19 (1985) ("[T]here is no empirical evidence that settlement rates have changed in
response to increased settlement conference activity. Settlement rates of about 90% are remarkably
constant in civil litigation, criminal cases, and family cases.") (citing Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 27-28 (1983)); see also
Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Model Rule for Collaborative Law, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 73, 82 (2005) (reporting "an overall settlement rate of 87.4% with recent cases settling at a
rate of 92.1%"). It appears therefore that whether through traditional adversary negotiation or CP,
most cases settle without going to trial. The great strength of CP is not that it is more likely to
generate settlement, but that it is likely to lead to settlement terms that best meet the goals of the
parties.
12. Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study in
Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 291 (2008).
13. Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984).
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settlement terms. As conflict increases, free sharing of information often
decreases. People tend to share only information that they are required to
share and to control the timing of sharing this information so as to
maximize their negotiating benefit.
Under CP, lawyers and clients focus their energy on the likely
outcome of the conflict-the settlement. CP's structure provides the
vehicle for both lawyers and clients to focus on and identify the most
mutually advantageous settlement of a case. Lawyers and clients work in
a structured process to disclose information, identify goals and priorities,
explore interests, expand settlement possibilities, and design settlement
options that are in the best interests of all parties. The CP lawyer's
primary job at all times is to insure that his or her client's interests, as
defined and identified by the client, are protected. Practiced this way, CP
generates satisfying and durable resolutions that benefit all clients.
In traditional forms of representation, the client gets the benefit of
lawyer advocacy, but loses control of the process and the outcome. In
litigation, the lawyers and judge control the process; the judge and/or
jury control the outcome. In traditional legal negotiation, the client also
loses control of most aspects of the case. Negotiations generally take
place between the lawyers alone. In theory, the client sets the goal of the
representation and must approve any settlement offers, but studies of
negotiation practices suggest that in fact lawyers are in control all the
way through. 14 In Austin Sarat and William Felstiner's studies of divorce
lawyers' client interviews, they found that the common pattern was for
lawyers to manipulate clients.15 They manipulate clients toward
settlement by exaggerating the risks of loss if a matter is litigated.16 They
maintain control of cases by portraying law as an "insiders"' game
where they have the necessary connections with public authorities.' 7 The
lawyers portray simple concepts of law in complex, unclear terms that
are beyond the understanding of the client.18 When trying to persuade
clients, "[t]hey construct meanings in the service of [their own]
power." 9 In contrast, CP avoids the risk of lawyer manipulation since so

14. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement
Expectations,Settlement Realities, and Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 LAW
& Soc. INQUIRY 795, 797 (1998) (discussing studies indicating lawyer control).
15. AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS:
POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 56-57 (1995).

16. See id. at 57.
17. Id. at 90-91.
18. Id. at 146.
19. Id. Pauline Tesler describes the real world of traditional settlement:
[S]uddenly, clients and lawyers appear at the courthouse for settlement negotiations.
Frequently, this event represents the first time that settlement has been discussed,
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much of it takes place in four-way meetings. The two attorneys provide
a check on each other. To the extent that there is an "insiders' game" in
CP, the clients are on the inside. CP elevates clients to the position of coparticipants in the negotiation and gives them the ability to control the
outcome. CP clients are an active part of the resolution of their disputes.
Whereas in traditional negotiation, clients, like traditional fathers at the
birth of their children, sit in a waiting room-actually separate waiting
rooms-while the lawyers work out some of the most important details
of the clients' future lives; in CP the clients shape and take ownership of
their futures.
CP tends to generate a different form of negotiation than traditional
pre-litigation negotiation. In traditional negotiation, once offers are put
forward, offers go back and forth in "a predetermined linear scale of
compromise." 20 These offers and counter offers divide what is at stake,
while ignoring or de-emphasizing each person's preferences and
interests. Creativity decreases. The competitive nature of the traditional
negotiation structure generates a "split the difference" approach. In
traditional adversarial negotiation, even parties and lawyers who
genuinely desire an out-of-court settlement cannot disregard the prospect
of litigation. The prospect of litigation defines the framework for
traditional negotiation and disclosure and shapes the bargaining
strategies. Lawyers must engage in a precarious balancing act between
litigation and negotiation.

because it is often the first time that both lawyers have been fully prepared regarding all
the issues of the case. The lawyers now suddenly shift gears, for settling the case
inevitably involves persuading the client that his or her case may not be so strong after
all and that compromise may be the wiser course. Clients often respond with confusion,
fear, or anger. "Why," they ask, "did you spend all this time and money preparing for
trial if our case is so weak? Why have you been telling me all these many months how
strong our position is and that I should hold out for more, when now you are telling me I
could lose?" Yet this is exactly how litigation-driven settlements work. Both sides
prepare vigorously for trial and are ready for battle when the court-supervised settlement
conference takes place. After months or even years of preparation, the client is pushed in
the course of a morning or a day to make a deal quickly. Negotiations take place in
private caucuses (lawyer-lawyer, lawyers-judge, lawyer-client) and the client-who
often had expected that at last, the time may have come when he or she can finally tell
the true story of the divorce-speaks only to the lawyer, not even to the spouse. Worse
yet, the lawyer now sounds less like a champion and more like the voice of doom.
Clients do often settle their cases under the intense pressure of the judicial settlement
conference but often emerge baffled and angry.
Tesler, supra note 8, at 969 n.8.
20. This phrase was coined by Carrie Menkel-Meadow, in the article TowardAnother View of
Legal Negotiation: The Structure ofProblem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 829 (1984).
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In contrast, CP encourages problem-solving 21 or interest-based
negotiation. Interest-based negotiation became an important aspect of
legal representation, beginning with the path-breaking book Getting to
Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, by Roger Fisher and
William Ury. 2 2 First published in 1981, and now translated into twentyfive languages, Getting to Yes popularized the ideas of separating the
people from the problem and focusing on the parties' underlying
interests, rather than their positions, so that mutually advantageous
exchanges can occur. 23 The sophistication that lawyers can bring to their
professional work as negotiators is increased when that role does not
need to be simultaneously balanced with the role of lawyer in an
adversarial system. When clients enter into CP, they engage their
lawyers as advisors and negotiators. This allows the lawyers to focus
their professional skills on problem solving, improving communication,
de-escalating conflict, and working steadily towards resolution of all
issues. CP can assist in achieving the aspiration suggested by Paul Brest
and Linda Krieger: "At their best, lawyers serve as society's general
problem solvers, skilled in avoiding as well as resolving disputes and in
facilitating public and private ordering." 2 4
The practical result of the disqualification agreement is that lawyers
are freed from the strategic maneuvering-for-advantage associated with
preparing a case for trial. This alteration of the lawyers' role, purpose,
and focus allows them to harness the efforts of all participants from the
start in an agreed, congruent set of steps aimed at a common goal. When
coupled with direct, supported negotiations between the clients, rather
than bargaining through their attorneys, the process encourages
creativity that does not arise in conventional negotiation.
The most extensive qualitative study of CP to date found that it
"reduces the posturing and gamesmanship of traditional lawyer-tolawyer negotiation, including highly inflated and lowball opening
proposals," "fosters a spirit of openness, cooperation and commitment to
finding a solution that differs qualitatively from solutions achieved
through conventional lawyer-to-lawyer negotiations," and produces

21. "Creative Problem-Solving" was first coined as a descriptor for an experimental law
school course in February 1962 at the University of Buffalo. Gordon A. MacLeod, Creative
Problem-Solving-forLawyers?!, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 198, 198 (1963).
22. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 10 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).

23. Id. at 10-55.
24. Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgement, 69 WASH. L. REV.
527, 529 (1994).
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results "that are both fair within a legal standard and satisfactory to the
* ,,25
parties.
As noted previously, in many cases CP lawyers have joined with
mental health and financial professionals to coordinate services that
clients often need in family law matters. Of course, it is not new that
clients retain these professionals at the same time that they retain
lawyers. What is new in the CP model is that these professionals work as
a team and coordinate their client services. The use of professionals
other than lawyers in the CP model is marked by flexibility. In some
cases, where there is limited conflict or limited resources, CP is
conducted by the lawyers and clients alone. In other cases, each side will
have its own financial advisor and mental health counselor/coach. In
child custody cases, the parties will often hire a single neutral children's
mental health expert to advise both parties. In cases involving financial
issues, they may hire a single neutral financial counselor to advise both
sides.26 All professionals in the interdisciplinary model enter into the
participation agreement with clients and agree that their involvement
ends if the matter proceeds to court. All professionals work to develop
processes within CP that support client communication and work to deescalate conflict between clients.
An advantage of CP over litigation is that it protects the parties'
privacy. One side effect of litigation is that many details about the
litigants and their lives become a matter of public record via court
documents and testimony. These details may involve sensitive personal
or financial information that is embarrassing or otherwise harmful. CP
avoids this pitfall by eschewing the formal court process and limiting
disclosure of the parties' information to the clients, the lawyers, and the
other professionals, all of whom are bound by a commitment to
confidentiality. 27
One of the most troubling aspects of the current state of family law
litigation is that many children are exposed to ongoing conflict as their
parents return to the adversarial system for post-judgment modification
orders. The experience of trial courts running "problem solving" or
25. JULIE MACFARLANE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE CAN., THE EMERGING PHENOMENON OF
COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW (CFL): A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF CFL CASES, at ix, x, 77 (2005),

available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pilfcy-fea/lib-bib/rep-rap/2005/2005_l/pdf/2005
1.pdf
(presented to the Family, Children and Youth Section, Department of Justice Canada).
26. The IACP's Ethical Standards address the unique role played by neutral advisors and
assign a high value to the continuation of neutrality beyond the granting of a divorce. See ES §§ 1011 (lACP 2008). Thus, ES sections 10 and 11 provide that a practitioner who serves as a neutral
must "adhere to that role" and "shall not" engage in any continuing client relationship that would
compromise the practitioner's neutrality. Id.
27. See the discussion of confidentiality and CP, infra Part III.C.
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"collaborative" courts suggests that CP will reduce the number of such
cases. 28 CP's professionals and conflict-resolving resources are available
to clients to work through any subsequent conflicts that may arise. Many
CP practitioners discuss with their clients post-agreement dispute
resolution processes that are designed to continue clients' commitment
to consensual dispute resolution. Many agreements build in the use of
divorce coaches and/or child specialists to help parents with postagreement modifications to parenting plans. Agreements also build in a
commitment to either mediation or CP for post-agreement disputes over
spousal or child support. Many CP professionals hope that the process of
CP will enable the parties to avoid post-agreement disputes. They seek
to make CP a transformative process, not merely a dispute resolving
process. They endeavor to assist clients in developing new
communication patterns and models of negotiation with each other, with
the aim of enabling them to work together, independent of professionals,
in the future.
III.

THE ABA AND IACP RULES GOVERNING COLLABORATIVE
PRACTICE LAWYERS

This section considers the rules that govern most CP lawyers, both
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRs") that regulate
most lawyers and the IACP Ethical Standards for Collaborative
Practitioners ("ES") that are held up as aspirations for legal, financial,
and mental health CP professionals. First, here is an introduction to both
sets of rules.
Lawyers are subject to the lawyers' professional rules of the state in
which they practice. Lawyers need to check the rules of their particular
states,2 9 but the vast majority of states pattern their rules after the MRs. 30

28. Mary Davidson, Circuit Court Judge, Hennepin County, Minnesota, asserted in her 2001
presentation to the Collaborative Family Law Council of Wisconsin that her collaborative problemsolving court virtually eliminated such problems. Mary Davidson, Circuit Court Judge, Hennepin
County, Minn., Presentation to Collaborative Family Law Council of Wisconsin (2001).
29. Each state's ethics rules are set forth at Cornell Univerity Law School, Legal Information
Institute: American Legal Ethics Library, http://www.law.comell.edulethics/ (last visited May 25,
2010).
30. Fairman, supranote I1, at 116. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2009).
The rules in a handful of states are patterned after the earlier ABA Model Code of Responsibility.
LINDA L. EDWARDS & J. STANLEY EDWARDS, INTRODUCTION TO PARALEGAL STUDIES AND THE

LAW: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 38 (2002). California, as in so many respects, sets its own rules, not
patterned after any of the other sets of rules. Id.
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Violations of state professional rules can subject lawyers to various
forms of discipline, including reprimands, suspension, and disbarment. 3 1
The rules of the legal profession govern lawyers who engage in a
wide variety of practice areas-prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers,
civil litigators, family lawyers, corporate lawyers, tax lawyers, and
government lawyers. Within a jurisdiction, all practice areas are
governed by the same code of ethics, with occasional variations for
particular types of lawyers. 32 In my view, CP operates well within the
parameters created for the legal profession, and no new ethics rules are
needed for CP. 33
The rules govern lawyers in the variety of roles that lawyers play.
As the Preamble to the MRs notes, lawyers perform a variety of
functions:
As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding
of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical
implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's
position under the rules of the adversary system. As a negotiator, a
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with
requirements of honest dealings with others. 34
As we shall see, the CP lawyer serves in each of these roles in the CP
process.
All of the rules of the legal profession and all of the professional
duties that flow to clients from that work (competence, diligence,

31. See Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving
Prosecutor:Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. 45,
77 (2005).
32. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8; id R. 1.11; id. R. 1.12 (setting
limits on advocacy for prosecutors and special rules for government lawyers and judges switching
to firms).
33. Accord John Lande, Principlesfor Policymaking About Collaborative Law and Other
ADR Processes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 619, 678-88 (2007). A few commentators have
advocated new legal ethics rules to address CP. See Fairman, supra note 11, at 116-21; Zachery Z.
Annable, Comment, Beyond the Thunderdome-The Search for a New Paradigm of Modern
Dispute Resolution: The Advent of Collaborative Lawyering and Its Conformity with the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 157, 168 (2005); Elizabeth K. Strickland,
Comment, Putting "Counselor" Back in the Lawyer's Job Description: Why More States Should
Adopt Collaborative Law Statutes, 84 N.C. L. REv. 979, 1001 (2006); see also Larry R. Spain,
CollaborativeLaw: A CriticalReflection on Whether a Collaborative Orientation Can Be Ethically
Incorporatedinto the PracticeofLaw, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 141, 156 (2004). In my view, the current
rules requiring client informed consent to limited representation provide all of the protection that
clients need regarding CP. The development of a Uniform Collaborative Statute creating a statutory
privilege for CP and giving explicit protection to the confidentiality of information shared in CP,
and adoption by states of such a statute will enhance the current confidentiality provisions relegated
to the participation agreement.
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. § 2.
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communication, confidentiality, efficiency, loyalty, and advocacy) apply
to lawyers in their CP work. This section examines the way those duties
bear upon CP lawyers. At some points, CP lawyers need to be
particularly diligent to take appropriate steps to comply with the rules. In
some areas, we will see that CP may do a better job of meeting the
underlying concerns of the Rules than traditional law practice.
As of 2008, the relevant legal professional authorities in several
states had specifically approved of lawyers engaging in CP. 35 Only one,
Colorado, had rendered an unfavorable opinion.36 In August 2007, the
ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
issued a formal opinion approving the use of CP,37 and addressing many
of the concerns raised by the Colorado ethics opinion. ABA formal
opinions do not have the force of law, but are influential in many
jurisdictions.
IACP is a non-profit, international community of legal, mental
health, and financial professionals working to transform the way in
which conflict is resolved worldwide through CP. 38 It provides a central
39
resource for CP education, networking, and standards of practice. The
IACP published its ES in 2005.40 They were amended in January 2008.41
IACP is not a disciplinary body, and thus, the ES are aspirational and not
binding. They form a starting point for professionals from each CP
discipline in understanding the ethics of CP, and are designed to provide
a framework to assure best interdisciplinary practices. The goals of the
ESs are to provide CP professionals with a common set of values and
process understanding, to help guide collaborative practitioners in
35. Global Collaborative Law Council, Ethics Opinions on Collaborative Law,
http://www.collaborativelaw.us/resources.html (last visited May. 25, 2010) (Minnesota (1997),
North Carolina (2002), Pennsylvania (2004), Maryland (2004), Kentucky (2005), New Jersey
(2005), Colorado (2007), Washington (2007), Missouri (2008)).
36. See opinions cited at PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE
RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 132-33 (2d ed. 2008) and Lande, supranote 33, at

682-88. Colorado found that for a lawyer to sign a four-way disqualification agreement created an
improper responsibility to a third party which might materially limit the lawyer's advocacy for the
client, but it stated that a two-way agreement to the same limitation, signed only by the clients,
would not create such a problem. Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115 (2007),
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/386/subID/10159/Ethics-Opinion- 115:-Ethical-Considerationsin-the-Collaborative-and-Cooperative-Law-Contexts,-02/24//; see also Schneyer, supra note 12, at
311-15 (2008) (discussing in detail Colorado Ethics Opinion 115).
37. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447, at 3 (2007)
(discussing ethical considerations in CP).
38. IACP, About IACP, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/_t.asp?M=3&T=About (last
visited May 25, 2010).
39. Id.
40. IACP, Standards, Ethics, and Principles, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/
t.asp?M=8&MS=5&T=Ethics (last visited May 25, 2010).
41. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss2/4

12

Cochran: Legal Ethics and Collaborative Practice Ethics

COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE ETHICS

2009]

549

making decisions and conducting cases, and to identify the
responsibilities of collaborative professionals to their clients, to other
collaborative professionals in the process, and to the public.42
ES 1.1 states specifically that in the event of a conflict between the
IACP standards and the ethical code pertinent to a professional, the
individual professional's code must be followed.43 The ES do not
override but rather compliment the disciplinary ethics rules of the
professionals engaged in CP. They create an overlay to the individual
professional's code that ensures conscious adherence to both the
professional ethical rules and the unique structure of the collaborative
process. Both the MRs and the ES address the core lawyer values of
client autonomy, lawyer competency, confidentiality, and loyalty.4 4
Each of the sets of rules is at times more specific than the other.
Stated another way, at times the MRs set a general standard and the ES
fill in the details, and at times the ES set a general standard and the MRs
fill in the details. For example, as we shall see, MR 1.1 merely states that
the lawyer must be "competent"; 45 the provisions of ES 2 identify some
of the requirements for CP competence.46 ES 3.1 defers to the
professional codes of the various CP professionals for a definition of
conflicts of interest; 47 MR 1.7 defines the lawyer's conflicts of interest. 48
Each of the sets of rules is at times more demanding than the other.
At times the MRs are more demanding. For example, MR 1.7 prohibits
lawyers from engaging in representation unless there is client consent
and "the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation"; 4 9 ES 3.1 merely requires
client consent to a conflict of interest.50 On the other hand, at times the
ES are more demanding. For example, ES 5.2 requires that the lawyer
enable the client to "make an informed decision about choice of
process." 1 MR 1.2 merely requires that the lawyer "consult" with the
client about alternative means of pursuing his objectives and obtain
"informed consent" to the lawyer's choice about limitations on "the
42. See ES pmbl. (IACP 2008).
43. Id. § 1.1 ("Any apparent or actual conflict between the Ethical Standards governing the
practitioner's discipline and these Standards should be resolved by the practitioner consistent with
the Ethical Standards governing the practitioner's profession.").
44.

See MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1-1.2; id. R. 1.4; id. R. 1.6-1.9 (2009); ES

pmbl., §§ 2-5, 8.
45. MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1.
46. See ES §§ 2.1-2.3.
47.

Id §3.1.

48.
49.
50.
51.

MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7.
Id
ES §3.1 cmt.
Id. § 5.2.
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scope of the [legal] representation."5 2 Of course, where one set of rules
is more demanding than the other, the lawyer can comply with each set
of rules by complying with the more strict rule.
A. Client Autonomy
Several portions of both the MRs and the ES promote one of the
key objectives of modem American legal representation-client
autonomy. The MRs' focus on client autonomy starts with MR 1.2(a),
which requires a lawyer to "abide" by the client's decisions concerning
the objectives of the representation. MR 1.4(a)(2) requires lawyers to
"reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's
objectives are to be accomplished."5 4 In addition, MR 1.4(b) requires the
lawyer to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation."55
ES 5.2 requires lawyers to give clients "a clear explanation of the
Collaborative process, which includes the obligations of the practitioner
and of the client(s) in the process, so that the client(s) may make an
informed decision about choice of process."5 6 ES 5.3 provides further:
A Collaborative practitioner shall assist the client(s) in establishing
realistic expectations in the Collaborative process and shall respect the
clients' self determination; understanding that ultimately the client(s)
is/are responsible for making the decisions that resolve their issues.57
Both sets of rules address the importance of informing clients about
all of the available dispute resolution options. Comment 5 to MR 2.1
notes that "when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may be
necessary under Rule 1.4 to inform the client of forms of dispute
resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation."5 8
ES 5.1 requires CP professionals to inform clients of "the full spectrum
of process options available for resolving disputed legal issues in their
case." 5 9
It is important that CP lawyers inform clients of other dispute
resolution processes, but it is also important that other lawyers inform
clients of CP. Indeed, if client autonomy is one of the key objectives of

52.

MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. R. 1.2(a).
Id R. 1.4(a)(2).
Id. R. 1.4(b).
ES § 5.2.
Id. §5.3.
MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 5.
Id
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legal representation, it makes sense for all lawyers to ensure that all
clients are provided with information about all process options. When
lawyers present all options to clients, client autonomy is expanded.
Conversely, if lawyers do not present all options to clients, they limit
client autonomy. For example, as the Kentucky CP ethics opinion states,
if the client's objective is to "obtain a divorce in the most amicable way
possible, then it is incumbent upon the lawyer to help the client find the
means to accomplish that goal." 6 0
As noted previously, the defining element of CP is the
disqualification agreement-the lawyers and the parties agree that these
lawyers will not represent these clients if the matter goes to litigation.
MR 1.2(c) specifically allows the scope of the legal representation to be
limited. 6 1 It provides: "A lawyer may limit the scope of the
representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and
the client gives informed consent." 62 Note that this rule imposes two
requirements for CP: 1) The client must give informed consent; and 2)
63
CP must be reasonable under the circumstances.
How does a client make an informed decision about CP? "Informed
consent" is defined by MR 1.0(e) as follows:
"Informed consent" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed
course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate

60.

Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. E-425, at 5 (2005).

61.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c). Some commentators have argued that CP

lawyers must find in MR 1.16(b) (listing situations in which a lawyer may withdraw from
representation) a basis for withdrawing from representation when negotiation fails. See Fairman,
supranote 11, at 91-92. Cf John Lande, Possibilitiesfor CollaborativeLaw: Ethics and Practice of
Lawyer Disqualificationand Process Control in a New Model ofLawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315,
1345-46 (2003). However, the lawyer may not need a justification for withdrawing in these
circumstances. See Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Leg. Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op.
2004-24, at 14 (2004). The relationship ends under the terms of the disqualification agreement if
settlement is not reached. But see id at 14-16 (recommending that CL lawyers take a conservative
approach and comply with Rule 1.16 when terminating representation if settlement is not reached).
As is clear from the discussion in the text, MR 1.2(c) clearly contemplates that lawyers can
represent clients for limited purposes. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c). If so, the
relationship must end if the lawyer has completed his or her limited responsibility. See id R. 1.2(c),
1.3 cmt. 4.
62. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c). The Ethics 2000 Commission made a
significant change to this provision. Before its amendment in 2002, the rule read: "A lawyer may
limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2000) (emphasis added). The change of "objectives" to "scope" in the
MRs clearly establishes that limited scope representation is acceptable. For a discussion on how to
break down ethical and malpractice barriers to "unbundling" legal services, including how to limit
the scope of representation, see MOSTEN, supranote 10, at ch. 6.
63.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c).
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information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably
available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct. 4
The client must determine whether he prefers CP to its alternatives
in light of the advantages and disadvantages of each.s The lawyer
should discuss the facts that might cut in favor of and against the use of
CP in the particular case. The great advantage to CP is that it is likely to
yield a value-adding resolution of the dispute that addresses the interests
of both parties. As noted in the previous section, CP also can give clients
the advantages of lawyer advocacy, control of the process, privacy, and
the coordinated use of mental health and financial professionals.
If CP successfully yields an agreement settling the differences
between the parties, that process will likely save the parties a substantial
amount of time, money, and emotional expense over what they would
have paid if they had litigated.6 6 In addition, because CP and the other
alternative dispute resolution processes can yield a creative, valueadding settlement, they can provide great benefit to the client in the long
run. The use of lawyers, mental health professionals, and financial
experts in CP may yield the most beneficial and enduring resolution of
the dispute.
However, like other means of alternative dispute resolutionincluding traditional negotiation-CP can add to the parties' expenses if
it fails. If an alternative means of dispute resolution fails, the client must
pay both for it and the expense of litigation. The costs of a failed
collaborative attempt may be greater than a failed mediation or
traditional negotiation attempt. If mediation or traditional negotiation
fails, the lawyer may proceed to litigation, whereas if CP fails, the
lawyer must withdraw and the client must obtain another attorney to
handle the litigation. Obtaining new counsel will involve start-up costs,
both financial and emotional.

64. Id. R. 1.0. Comment 6 to MR 1.0 describes informed consent as follows:
The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client ... possesses
information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will
require communication that includes ... any explanation reasonably necessary to inform
the client . .. of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of
conduct and a discussion of the client's . . . options and alternatives.
Id. R. 1.0 cmt. 6.
65. For an example of full discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of CP, see David
A. Hoffman et al., Collaborative Family Law, in MASSACHUSETI-rs DIVORCE LAW PRACTICE

MANUAL 4-i (2008).
66. In one survey, clients who participated in CP reported spending an average of 6.3 months
and $8777 in attorneys' fees in the process. Schwab, supra note 9, at 376-77. Of course the time
involved will vary substantially, depending on the nature of the issues and the cooperativeness of
the parties. See id.
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MR 2.1 provides that throughout the process of counseling clients
about CP, lawyers must "exercise independent professional judgment
and render candid advice." 6 7 "[L]awyer[s] may refer not only to law but
[also] to . . . moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be

relevant to the client's situation." 68 CP is designed to address the broad
range of client needs and may involve counseling about any and all of
these factors. In a divorce context, "moral, economic, [and] social"
factors 69 are likely to be especially important. Moral concerns for the
other members of the family are likely to be relevant and divorce is
likely to have a greater impact on a client's financial future and social
relations than any other event in his or her life. 70 These matters should
be the subject of continuing discussions with the client, so that the
lawyer's actions will reflect the wishes of the client.
The Comment to ES 5 specifically mentions MR 2.1:
As the Comment to Rule 2.1 explains, the attorney's advice can
properly include moral, ethical, and practical considerations, and may
indicate that there is more involved in resolving a particular dispute or
even the client's entire case than strictly legal considerations. In
Collaborative practice, the practitioner specifically contracts with the
client(s) to provide advice that recognizes a full range of options for
dispute resolution and takes into consideration relationship and family
structures when looking at the possible outcomes for the client(s). 7
As noted above, the lawyer may not engage in CP where CP is not
a reasonable option.72 The lawyer and client should weigh the possibility
67. Id. R. 2.1. Some have suggested that the ideological commitment of some lawyers to CL
clouds their objectivity when advising clients. See MACFARLANE, supra note 25, at 25-27.
Obviously this is a risk, but compared to what? It could as well be said that the ideological
commitment of some lawyers to courtroom advocacy clouds their objectivity. There is a risk that
lawyers who prefer litigation will push their clients toward litigation. In fact, in the client
solicitation cases, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that lawyers' temptations to solicit and
overcome client preferences in profit-generating cases is greater than in ideological-commitment
cases. Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434, 436, 439 (1978) (prohibition on lawyer solicitation
rejected in law change case), with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 467 (1978)
(prohibition on lawyer solicitation upheld in profit-generating personal injury case). All lawyers
need to recognize that clients may have different preferences than they have and that clients should
exercise informed control over the most important aspects of their cases.
68.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1.

69. See id.
70. See Pauline Tesler's description of the CP lawyer as "an engaged moral agent," in
PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE
WITHOUT LITIGATION 160-61 (2001).

71. ES § 5 cmt. (IACP 2008).
72. John Lande and Forrest Mosten note that CP books have identified the following factors
that lawyers should consider in determining the suitability of a case for CP: personal motivation,
suitability of the parties, trustworthiness, domestic violence, mental illness, substance abuse,
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of the success or failure of CP, in light of what the lawyer and client
know about the dispute, the other party, and the other lawyer. CP
requires willing lawyers and willing clients on both sides. CP would not
be a reasonable option if it is clear that it would fail. But so long as there
is a reasonable possibility that it would succeed, the lawyer should allow
the client to determine whether it is worth the risk.
Cases involving domestic violence raise special considerations
when assessing whether or not to pursue CP. The practitioner should
frankly discuss the risks of CP with a client who has experienced
physical or emotional violence. There is a danger that an abusing spouse
will control the client during negotiations. Special care must be taken in
such situations to assure that the client can be autonomous in decision
making. In such a situation, the lawyer must have the ability to counsel
the client about the special risks that the client confronts.n
B. Competence andDiligence
Under the ABA MRs, CP lawyers, like all lawyers, must be
competent 74 and diligent. 7 5 The IACP ES require that a CP "shall
practice within the scope of the Collaborative practitioner's training,
competency, and professional mandate of practice."76 In addition, the ES
establish minimum training requirements for CP professionals.77

suitability of the lawyers, fear or intimidation of parties, and risks of disqualification. See John
Lande & Forrest S. Mosten, Collaborative Lawyers' Duties to Screen the Appropriateness of
CollaborativeLaw and Obtain Clients'InformedConsent to Use CollaborativeLaw, 25 OHIO ST. J.
DIsP. RESOL. 347, 369 (2010).
73. See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING PARENTS IN ABUSE &

NEGLECT CASES R. 11 & cmt. (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/child/legalrep-1.pdf,
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES

R. A-1 (1996), available at http://www.abanet.org/child/repstandwhole.pdf;

ABA COMM'N ON

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS REPRESENTING VICTIMS OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND STALKING IN CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER CASES 134-

35 (2007), availableat http://www.abanet.org/domviol/docs/StandardsCommentary.pdf.
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009). The ES require adherence to the
competence requirements of the individual's profession and further impose requirements of
specialized education in CP and mediation. ES §2.
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3.
76. ES § 2.3.
77. ES section 2.2 requires a twelve-hour course in CP before a professional begins practice.
ES §2.2. In addition, the IACP requires a thirty-hour course in mediation skills and another fifteen
hours of course work in skills relied on in the practice of CP. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
COLLABORATIVE PRACTITIONERS § 2 (IACP 2004), available at https://www.collaborative
The IACP maintains aspirational
practice.comlib/Ethics/IACPPractitionerStandards.pdf.
standards for Trainers, Trainings, and Practitioners. See id.; MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
COLLABORATIVE BASIC TRAINING (IACP 2004), available at https://www.collaborative
practice.com/liblEthics/IACPTmingStdsAdptd 407 13 Corctd.pdf, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss2/4

18

Cochran: Legal Ethics and Collaborative Practice Ethics

2009]

COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE ETHICS

555

Competence initially requires that the lawyer effectively engage the
client in a discussion about whether the dispute is one which is
appropriate for CP. As discussed in the previous section, the competent
lawyer will present CP as an option to the client if the client's
circumstances suggest that CP might yield a successful result. The
decision whether to pursue CP may turn on the facts of the case, as well
as the characteristics of the other lawyer and client. If a settlement is
unlikely to be negotiated, CP may be a waste of the client's time, money,
and emotional energy.
CP lawyers must be competent in the law of the subject matter
relevant to the case. They must advise the client of the likely result if the
matter goes to court. As one of the clients in Macfarlane's study said, "I
want my lawyer to give legal advice, [so that I] know my rights."7 This
is important both at the preliminary stage when the client is determining
whether to pursue CL and at the final stage when the client is
determining whether to settle. At the preliminary stage, such information
will enable the client to determine whether pursuing CP would be
advantageous. During the process of negotiation, such information will
enable the client to determine whether various settlement options are to
his advantage.
CP lawyers must also be competent advocates. This role is
necessarily refrained from advocacy in more traditional representation.
The CP lawyer is hired to pursue a process that differs from the
positional bargaining that is most common under the adversarial system.
To attain the highest level of skill in CP advocacy is often a difficult
transition for lawyers. To engage effectively in CP advocacy, lawyers
must develop their client interview skills, ask open-ended questions, and
elicit information from clients that is more comprehensive than
information about the legal issues alone. The CP lawyer may find herself
spending much more time listening intently to clients than she did in her
work as an advocate within the adversarial process. Discussing the law
and giving legal advice in a manner that does not escalate conflict and
that avoids the positional entrenchment that is common in adversarial
advocacy is one of the new advocacy skills necessary for CP lawyers.79
Not only does CP's new advocacy require the lawyer to have
different client-counseling skills, it also requires both collaborative
lawyers to exercise different skills in their working relationship.
COLLABORATIVE TRAINERS (lACP 2004), available at https://www.collaborativepractice.com/
lib/Ethics/IACP-TrnerStds-Adptd-40713-Corctd.pdf.
78. MACFARLANE, supra note 25, at 38.
79. For a discussion of advocacy within CP, see NANCY J. CAMERON, COLLABORATIVE
PRACTICE: DEEPENING THE DIALOGUE 121-44 (2004).
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Competence for the collaborative lawyer requires the ability to facilitate
negotiations with clients and lawyers in the room together, in a
respectful and non-confrontational manner. For clients to be able to fully
participate in the CP process, the lawyers need to be able to work
together to provide an atmosphere conducive to client negotiation. The
participation agreement begins to create the negotiating environment,
both with the disqualification provision and with the contractual promise
of confidentiality, but the lawyers also have an obligation to transform
the contractual elements of the participation agreement into a safe,
working, four-way environment for clients.
Another aspect of competence for the collaborative lawyer is the
ability to engage in interest-based bargaining. In CP, parties commit
themselves to interest-based bargaining, the form of bargaining that is
likely to lead to the best settlement for all of the parties.80 This skill is at
the heart of the service that the lawyer gives to the client in CP.
In addition to acting competently, collaborative lawyers must "act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."81
The competent CP lawyer will carefully manage client preparation so
that negotiation sessions will bear the most fruit for the client and all
involved. The CP process includes the creation of meeting agendas and
work assignments for lawyers, clients and the other professionals
engaged in the case. As noted previously, in many cases, CP resolves
disputes faster than traditional processes. 82 Litigation delays may occur
due to congested court schedules and negotiation is often based on the
chance availability and interest of the lawyers and clients in settlement at
the same time. This is not to say that the CP process always proceeds
rapidly or more rapidly than other processes. In CP, much attention is
given to the clients being ready both emotionally and with the necessary
factual background before proceeding with the negotiation. CP's
scheduled negotiations avoid the tendency in traditional representation
for all negotiations to occur at the time of scheduled court hearings.
Some have suggested that CP is inconsistent with lawyer diligence,
because under CP the client gives up the option of having the lawyer
litigate the matter. But giving up this option is not unlike any other
concession that a client makes during legal representation. Each side has
laid down one possible weapon (his lawyer's participation in litigation),
in exchange for the other party laying down his or her corresponding
weapon. It is not unlike the parties agreeing to engage in binding

80. See supranotes 21-24 and accompanying text.
81. MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2009). The lawyer must also act promptly. Id.
82. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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arbitration or agreeing that neither will appeal the decision of a trial
court-each party gives up a future procedural option in exchange for
the other party doing the same. In fact, CP represents a more modest
concession than agreeing to binding arbitration or agreeing not to appeal.
In CP, the parties only give up the right to their current attorney, should
the case proceed to the next level. Viewed simply as a result of linear
bargaining, there is an equal concession on each side. The hope of each
side, and the experience of many who have engaged in CP, is that the
agreement to enter into it will be a win-win arrangement-that it will
lead to agreements that are better suited to both of the parties than those
they were likely to get through other dispute resolution processes. The
agreement that CP counsel will not litigate is like any other bargaining
concession-it is made by both parties in the hope that it will benefit
them. It should be done if it appears that it will benefit the client and is
an expression of the client's values.
Diligence on the part of a CP lawyer may be somewhat different
than the aggressive representation practiced by some lawyers in
traditional practice. Indeed, the IACP rules dictate that collaborative
practitioners "shall encourage parents to remain mindful of the needs
and best interests of their child(ren)"8 3 and "avoid contributing to the
conflict of the [parties]." 84 Consideration of the interests of all who
might be affected by representation and avoiding conflict are important
aspects of CP. Assuming that the client has been effectively informed of
the nature of CP, these will be important aspects of diligence on the part
of the lawyer. The competent CP lawyer will determine how high a
priority the client places on preserving relationships with the opposing
party and protecting third parties (such as the children of a marriage in
the family dispute context). If the client places a high priority on these
factors, they are the client's interests. These factors will guide the lawyer
in client counseling and advocacy during the representation.
Both the MRs and the ES note that lawyers should recognize when
a matter is beyond their expertise. Comment 4 to MR 2.1 notes:
Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the
domain of another profession. Family matters can involve problems
within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology
or social work; business matters can involve problems within the
competence of the accounting profession or of financial specialists.
Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself

83. ES § 5.4 (IACP 2008).
84. Id. § 5.5.
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something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should
make such a recommendation. 85
As noted previously, collaborative lawyers have been among the
leaders in recognizing the value to clients of expert advisors from fields
other than law.86 In many cases, CP draws together lawyer, mental
health, child development, and financial advisor teams to counsel the
clients. ES 2.3 provides that the lawyer should discuss with the client the
possibility of engaging an interdisciplinary CP team in order to be sure
the proper competencies are at the table in the collaborative process.8 7
C. Confidentialityand Candor
All of CP's primary professional disciplines (law, mental health,
and finance) share a core value of confidentiality. One of the basic
understandings a client has of such advisors is that they will not divulge
confidential information. How does CP reconcile the basic value of
confidentiality with CP's requirements of full disclosure and
transparency?
MR 1.6(a) prohibits a lawyer from "reveal[ing] information relating
to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent,
[or] the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation." 8 MR 4.1 prohibits the lawyer from knowingly
"mak[ing] a false statement of material fact or law to a third person," but
does not impose on the lawyer an affirmative obligation to provide
89
information to third parties. CP participation agreements impose a
greater duty to disclose than provided by these rules. Under CP
participation agreements, the parties and lawyers pledge to be
forthcoming to the opposing party and lawyer with financial and other
relevant information. 90

85. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 4.
86. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
87. ES § 2.3. The comment to ES section 2.3 states:
[T]he Collaborative practitioner must be willing to turn to other professionals both
within and outside of the Collaborative process, such as mental health professionals,
medical professionals, financial professionals, vocational specialists and possibly
rehabilitation counselors in the areas of physical disability, substance abuse, and
domestic violence.
Id. § 2.3 cmt.
88. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a). In addition, Rule 1.6(b)(3) permits
lawyers, in some circumstances, to disclose information to prevent other people from suffering
substantial financial loss or personal injury. Id. R. 1.6(b)(3).
89. Id. R. 4.1.
90. See, e.g., TESLER, supra note 70, at 149 (providing a sample participation agreement that
includes the timely disclosure and discovery of relevant information).
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As noted, under MR 1.6 the lawyer can disclose information if "the
client gives informed consent, [or] the disclosure is impliedly authorized
in order to carry out the representation." 9' In order to meet the informed
consent requirement of MR 1.6, the CP lawyer must inform the client of
the type of information that they will be required to disclose to the
opposing side. 92 If the agreement provides that the lawyer will withdraw
if the client fails to provide full information, the lawyer must gain the
client's informed consent to such a provision.93 It is important that the
attorney fully explain to the client that CP mandates voluntary disclosure
of all relevant information. If the client has any reservations about this
imperative, then CP is not the dispute resolution means for him.
The ES require that discrete steps be taken to assure the client's
understanding of and informed consent to CP's limits on confidentiality.
ES 4.1 directs the collaborative professional to "inform the client(s)
about confidentiality requirements and practices" of the practitioner's
profession, and ES 4.2 requires the professional to secure in the
participation agreement the clear written consent of the client to the
disclosure of information material to the process. 94 In addition, the ES
require that if a client refuses to disclose pertinent information, the
attorney and other professionals will withdraw from the process.9 5 If
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a).
92. See ES § 5.2.
93. Id. §7.1(A)(2).
94. Id. §4.1-4.2. In its entirety, ES section 4 (Confidentiality) provides:
4.1 A Collaborative practitioner shall fully inform the client(s) about confidentiality
requirements and practices in the specific Collaborative process that will be offered to
the clients.
4.2 A Collaborative practitioner may reveal privileged information only with permission
of the client(s), according to guidelines set out clearly in the Collaborative practitioner's
Participation Agreement(s) or as required by law.
Comment
The rules of confidentiality are among the most important core values of the legal and
mental health professions. Those standards may be modified by the terms of the
Collaborative practitioner's fee and/or participation agreement with the client(s), so long
as the modifications are consistent with the ethical standards of the practitioner's
discipline.

Id. 4.
95. Id. §§ 7.1, 9.1-9.3. ES section 7.1(A)(l)-(2) provides:
7.1. A Collaborative Participation Agreement and/or Fee Agreement shall be in writing,
signed by the parties and the Collaborative practitioners, and must include provisions
containing the following elements:
A. Pertainine to Full Disclosure of Information
1. No participant in a Collaborative case, whether a Collaborative practitioner
or a client, may knowingly withhold or misrepresent information material to
the Collaborative process or otherwise act or fail to act in a way that
knowingly undermines or takes unfair advantage of the Collaborative
process;
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professionals on both sides adhere to these steps, the parties and
professionals can be assured that the parties and lawyers will be engaged
in the steps that ensure the open communication and candor that are so
essential to the process.
Under the participation agreement's provision that the parties will
be forthcoming in CP, the parties merely agree to what some rules of
civil procedure require and to disclosure of what the parties could find
through discovery anyway. Just as a lawyer has a duty to respond
honestly to discovery requests under MR 3.496 and many civil procedure
rules, the CP lawyer has a duty to disclose information agreed to in the
participation agreement. To fail to do so, in violation of the client's
commitment, may assist the client in committing fraud, in violation of
MR 4.1.9

2. If a client knowingly withholds or misrepresents information material to
the Collaborative process, or otherwise acts or fails to act in a way that
undermines or takes unfair advantage of the Collaborative process, and the
client continues in such conduct after being duly advised of his or her
obligations in the Collaborative process, such continuing conduct will
mandate withdrawal of the Collaborative Practitioner and if such result was
clearly stated in the Participation and/or Fee Agreement, the conduct shall
result in termination of the Collaborative Process.
Id. 7.1(A)(l)-(2). ES section 9 (Withdrawal/Termination) provides:
9.1 If a Collaborative practitioner learns that his or her client is withholding or
misrepresenting information material to the Collaborative process, or is otherwise acting
or failing to act in a way that knowingly undermines or takes unfair advantage of the
Collaborative process, the Collaborative practitioner shall advise and counsel the client
that:
A. Such conduct is contrary to the principles of Collaborative Practice; and
B. The client's continuing violation of such principles will mandate the withdrawal
of the Collaborative practitioner from the Collaborative process, and, where
permitted by the terms of the Collaborative practitioner's contract with the client,
the termination of the Collaborative case.
9.2 If, after the advice and counsel described in Section 9.1, above, the client continues
in the violation of the Collaborative Practice principles of disclosure and/or good faith,
then the Collaborative practitioner shall:
A. Withdraw from the Collaborative case; and
B. Where permitted by the terms of the Collaborative practitioner's contract with
the client, give notice to the other participants in the matter that the client has
terminated the Collaborative process.
9.3 Nothing in these ethical standards shall be deemed to require a Collaborative
practitioner to disclose the underlying reasons for either the professional's withdrawal or
the termination of the Collaborative process.
Id. §§ 9.1-9.3. ES section 8.1 also requires the practitioner to secure the client's written consent to
"share information as appropriate to the process with all other collaborative professionals in the
case." Id § 8.1.
96.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4.

97. MR 4.1 provides that the lawyer may not disclose information if "prohibited by Rule 1.6,"
but MR 1.6 itself provides that the lawyer can disclose information "to prevent the client from
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What happens if a fully informed client in the midst of a
collaborative process refuses to permit disclosure of material
information? The ES provide that even when care is taken to secure
informed consent, a lawyer should not disclose confidential information
if the client revokes the general waiver and instructs the lawyer not to
divulge information. In this circumstance, the duty of the lawyer is
spelled out in ES 9.98 A lawyer who learns that the client is withholding
or misrepresenting material information is required to clearly counsel the
client that such conduct is contrary to the principles of CP and the
written participation agreement and that continuation of that conduct
will mandate the withdrawal of the lawyer. 99 ES 9.2 provides that if the
client continues in violation of the principles of disclosure and/or good
faith, then the practitioner shall withdraw from the case. 0 0 Of course,
withdrawal from the process is likely to be seen by the other side as an
implied disclosure that the client is withholding material information.
CP raises two additional confidentiality issues: whether all of the
lawyers, parties, and experts are required by law to keep information
shared during the collaborative process confidential from outside sources
and whether such information is protected from disclosure as an
evidentiary matter. Collaborative participation agreements generally
provide that all information shared during CP and documents prepared
for the collaborative case will be kept in confidence by all lawyers,
parties, and experts, and are inadmissible in court. It is likely that both
courts and legislatures will protect the confidentiality of information
shared in CP, just as they have done for information shared in
mediation.'0 1 Some courts will issue a court order at the commencement
of a collaborative case, mandating the confidentiality of information
disclosed during the collaborative case. 10 2 In a few states, confidentiality
committing ... a fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial
interests ... of another." Id. R. 4.1, 1.6(b)(2).
98. See ES §9.
99. Id. § 9.1.
100. Id. § 9.2.
101. See sources cited in Sarah Rudolph Cole, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation: A
Promise Unfufilled?, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1419, 1419 n.1 (2006) (citing cases and statutes and
arguing that "mediation communications should be privileged .. .and that confidentially is the key
to ensuring that mediation programs are successful").
102. In some jurisdictions, the participation agreement is filed in court as a stipulation and
includes confidentiality provisions. Wisconsin is one of these jurisdictions and its Stipulation and
Order for CL contains the following language:
Statements made by either party during any meeting shall be protected as if the
statements were made in mediation, and no such communications shall be deemed a
waiver of any privilege by any party. However, statements that indicate an intent or
disposition to do any of the following actions are not privileged: to endanger the health
or safety of the other party, or of the children of either party; to conceal or change the
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of information disclosed during a collaborative case is mandated by
statute.103 Section 16 of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act ("UCLA"),
enacted in 2009, provides that communications in CP are confidential if
the parties so provide.10
A separate issue is whether information revealed during a
collaborative case is admissible in a later court case. The duty of
confidentiality is often confused with the attorney-client privilege. The
duty of confidentiality is an ethical responsibility and, with some
exceptions, prohibits disclosure of any information obtained during
representation.105 The attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence that
prohibits the lawyer from testifying to information conveyed in
confidence by the client to the lawyer.106 In general, the attorney-client
privilege does not apply to communications that take place in the
presence of other persons, such as communications during CP
negotiation sessions. 0 7 Some states have passed collaborative statutes,
which create a statutory privilege for information exchanged during the
collaborative process.'0 8 Section 17 of the UCLA creates a statutory
privilege for collaborative cases.109
D. Loyalty and Conflicts ofInterest
MR 1.7(a) prohibits lawyers from representing a client if the
representation "will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities
to" the lawyer or another person." 10 This conflict can be waived if "the
lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation" to the client, and the client
residence of any child; to commit irreparable economic damage to the property of either
party; or to conceal income or assets.
State of Wisconsin, Circuit Court, Family Court Branch, Stipulation and Order for Collaborative
Law, at 3 (2007), available at http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/Innovations%2OPubs/INNOV%20FLP%
20Chapter/o202%20Appendix%20B.pdf.
103. For example, the North Carolina Collaborative statute provides: "All communications and
work product of any attorney or third-party expert hired for purposes of participating in a
collaborative law procedure shall be privileged and inadmissible in any court proceeding, except by
agreement of the parties." N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §50-77 (2008).
104. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 16 (2009), in 38 HOFSTRA L. REv. 421, 485 (2010)
[hereinafter UCLA].
105. Robert H. Aronson et al., Attorney-Client Confidentiality and the Assessment of Claimants
Who Allege PosttraumaticStress Disorder,76 WASH. L. REv. 313, 322-23 (2001).
106. Id.
107. The traditional rules preventing the admission of offers of settlement and documents made
for purposes of settlement will presumably apply to CP. By definition, anything prepared for
purposes of collaborative negotiations would have been prepared for purposes of settlement.
108. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603(h) (Vernon 2006); UCLA § 16, at 485.
109. UCLA § 17, at 485-86.
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2009).
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consents.'11 The ES require the lawyer to obtain informed consent to a
conflict of interest,'1 2 but do not have a separate requirement of
reasonableness. Since the ES require professionals to comply with the
provisions of their own professional rules, if there is a conflict of
interest, CP lawyers must: (1) reasonably believe that they can provide
competent and diligent representation; and (2) obtain informed consent.
It has been alleged that CP creates a few types of conflicts of interest.
It might be argued that some lawyers' interest in pursuing CP
conflict with the client's interest in pursuing another means of dispute
resolution. A lawyer who develops expertise in CP and not in litigation
might be tempted to steer a client toward CP and away from litigation.
But this temptation is no different than the temptation that all lawyers
face to steer clients toward their areas of expertise. In fact, there may be
less temptation for lawyers to steer clients toward CP than litigation,
because litigation is likely to generate more lawyer hours and income
than CP. If anything, CP is against the lawyer's interest. As noted in the
earlier section on client autonomy, at the beginning of the representation,
all lawyers should present all of the reasonable alternatives and the
advantages and disadvantages of each to clients.l13
John Lande at one time argued that when the lawyer and client
enter CP the disqualification agreement "creates incentives for lawyers
to pressure their clients to settle inappropriately and leave clients without
an effective advocate to promote their interests and protect them from
settlement pressure."ll4 But what is the source of the CP lawyer's
alleged "incentive" to pressure parties into a settlement? It is not money.
The CP lawyer gets no more money if a settlement is reached than if it is
not. Unlike lawyers in traditional negotiation (who can represent the
client if the matter goes to litigation) the CP lawyer will not be
influenced by the incentive to obtain additional work from the client.
The CP lawyer might have an incentive to generate a settlement in order
to maintain a high settlement record or to maintain a reputation as a
"team player" among CP professionals, but a lawyer who pressures
clients would be likely to get a bad reputation from a dissatisfied client
who feels that she was pushed into settlement.
Here again, the lawyers' pressures to settle a CP case are no
different from the sorts of pressures that lawyers must resist all of the
111. Id R. 1.7(b).
112. See ES § 3.1 & cmt. (IACP 2008).
113. See supra Part II.A.
114. See Lande, supra note 61, at 1328-29; see also Gary M. Young, Malpractice Risks of
CollaborativeDivorce, Wis. LAW., May 2002, at 14, 16, 54-55 (discussing additional malpractice
concerns of CL).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4

564

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:537

time. Lawyers who bill on an hourly basis are tempted to do extra work
for a client; lawyers who handle a case on a flat fee or contingent fee
basis are often tempted to pressure clients to settle. Some conflicts of
interest are a way of life for lawyers and the conflicts that a CP lawyer
might face to pressure clients toward settlement are much like those
faced by lawyers all of the time.
The Colorado CP ethics opinion, written prior to the ABA opinion
approving of CP and prior to the adoption by Colorado of the relevant
ABA MR, found that the withdrawal agreement creates a conflict of
interest.115 It found that the CP lawyer's representation of the client is
"materially limited" by the opposing party, because it allows the
opposing party to prohibit the lawyer from going to court by refusing to
settle.1 6 This is pure formalism. It is certainly an odd thing to call a
conflict of interest. The lawyer's refusal to go to court is better viewed
as the lawyer complying with the client's instructions. One might as well
say that a lawyer and client create a conflict of interest for the lawyer
when they make an offer of settlement to the opposing party, because the
opposing party can control the lawyer by accepting the settlement offer.
In fact, CP removes a significant conflict of interest that arises in
traditional negotiation, where the lawyer often has a significant incentive
not to settle a case. In traditional lawyer negotiation, the lawyer who
fails to settle the case will generally litigate it and receive additional
money. I do not mean to suggest that lawyers are unable to handle the
conflict of interest that accompanies traditional negotiation. However,
CP probably removes a greater conflict of interest from the lawyer than
it allegedly creates.
The key to avoiding conflicts of interest problems in CP is the care
taken in explaining CP to the client. A lawyer and a well-informed CP
client will have the same interests. As the ABA opinion on CP notes:
When a client has given informed consent to a representation limited to
collaborative negotiation toward settlement, the lawyer's agreement to
withdraw if the collaboration fails is not an agreement that impairs her
ability to represent the client, but rather is consistent with the client's
limited goals for the representation.117

115. Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., supranote 36.
116. Id.; see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof I Responsibility, supra note 37, at 4 & n.14. But see THE IACP ETHICS TASK FORCE, THE
ETHICS OF THE COLLABORATIVE PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT: A CRITIQUE OF COLORADO'S

MAVERICK ETHICS OPINION, https://www.collaborativepractice.com/lib/Ethics/EthicsTFArticle
ColoradoOpinion.pdf (refuting the Colorado Opinion's assertion that CL materially limits the
lawyer's responsibility to the client).
117. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, supra note 37, at 4.
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In CP the lawyer's commitment is to the client. The lawyer's
commitment to attempt a settlement and withdraw if one is not reached
flows from his or her commitment to the client who has chosen CP
because the client wants to pursue an amicable settlement." 8
E. Other Ethics Rules and the CP Lawyer
In addition to the legal ethics rules discussed previously, there are
several additional rules that might raise issues related to CP.
1. Fees
MR 1.5(a) prohibits the lawyer from charging an unreasonable
fee. 119 Whereas MR 1.5(b) recommends that the fee agreement be in
writing, ES 6.1 requires that CP professionals' fees be in writing.12 0
2. Partnerships With Other CP Professionals
In many collaborative cases, CP lawyers work with financial and
mental health professionals, and some CP professionals might consider
establishing more permanent business relationships with each other. The
legal ethics rules provide significant restrictions on such relationships.
Under the MRs, lawyers may not share legal fees with, form a
partnership with, or submit to the direction of a non-lawyer, 12 1 including,
in the CP context, one of the other specialists that may be involved in a
case. To my knowledge and that of those in the leadership of the IACP,
CP practitioners have not founded interdisciplinary firms. 12 2
3. Other CP Professionals as the Lawyer's Employees
Though under the previously described MR, lawyers cannot work
for non-lawyers, they can employ non-lawyers and offer non-legal
services. MR 5.7(a)(2) provides that a lawyer is bound by the legal
profession's rules when providing such services unless she takes
reasonable measures to see that the client knows that these are not legal
118.

See id. at 2.

119.
120.
121.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a).
Id. R. 1.5(b); ES § 6.1(IACP 2008).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4.

122. Some collaborative professionals have created "collaborative centers" in which one or
more professionals purchase or lease a building or office space and other collaborative professionals
become tenants in the space. This kind of arrangement, assuming all professionals adhere to the
requirements of confidentiality and file security within the space, seems without question to be
ethically appropriate.
In addition, many CP professionals have created CP professional groups. These are
generally non-profit or educational organizations formed to advance CP and to ensure educational
opportunities in CP. Those organizations have not been engaged in the practice of CP.
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services and do not have the lawyer-client relationship protections.12 3 1
do not know of CP lawyers who have employed other CP professionals,
but if they did so, it appears that the lawyer and the other professionals
could represent the same client. However, it is clear under the ES that
such a professional could not be shared by the parties as a neutral expert
(as contrasted with a client representative) in a case. ES 10 emphasizes
the importance of the neutrality of financial and psychological
specialists who are engaged as neutrals (advise both parties) in the

process.12 4
4. Out-of-State Practice
Under the MRs, a lawyer can engage in CP in a jurisdiction in
which she is not admitted "if the services arise out of or are reasonably
related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is
admitted to practice." 25 Given the increasing mobility of society, and
the strong possibility that in the divorce setting one of the parties will
have moved to another state, this feature may enable clients to have the
CP lawyers of their choice, without unauthorized practice of law
concerns in a foreign state.
5. Restrictions on Practice
Finally, CP lawyers should be aware that MR. 5.6(b), which
precludes a lawyer from making "an agreement in which a restriction on
the lawyer's right to practice is a part of the settlement of a client
controversy," 2 6 does not apply to a CP participation agreement. The CP
participation agreement is not "the settlement of a client controversy."l12 7
The comment to MR 5.6 makes it clear that the rule is designed to
prohibit "a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons."l 2 8
IV.

CONCLUSION

CP not only falls squarely within the ethical boundaries of the legal
profession, it also encourages lawyers to move beyond the simple
prescriptions of the MRs; to think about transforming the quality of
justice in a time when the public is demanding a more timely, personally
123.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7(a)(2).

124. See ES
specialists).
125.

§

10 (discussing rules to ensure neutrality of the financial and psychological

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(3).

126. Id. R. 5.6(b).
127. Id.
128. Id. R. 5.6 cmt. 2; see also Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., supra note 60, at 7 (noting that
the disqualification agreement "is not the kind of restrictive covenant contemplated by Rule 5.6").
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responsive, system of justice. As Brest and Krieger have argued, "[a]t
their best, lawyers serve as society's general problem solvers, skilled in
avoiding as well as resolving disputes and in facilitating public and
private ordering."l 29 CP creates strong incentives for lawyers to fit this
goal.
CP has grown steadily in the last two decades because those most
affected by legal conflict (clients) and those most knowledgeable about
legal conflict (lawyers)130 want something different. Many lawyers have
embraced it, despite the fact that it seems to be contrary to their financial
interests. It may be that CP will influence the way that all law is
practiced. It could shift the lawyer norm from thinking primarily about
"winning" for a client at the expense of the other party, to thinking about
reaching a settlement from which all can benefit. Such changes move in
the direction sought by clients who complain that legal fees are too high
and that lawyers create conflict.
As early as 1984, United States Supreme Court Chief Justice
Warren Burger spoke of lawyers as healers of conflict:
The entire legal profession-lawyers, judges, law teachers-has
become so mesmerized with the stimulation of the courtroom contest
that we tend to forget that we ought to be healers-healers of
conflicts.... Should lawyers not be healers? Healers, not warriors?
Healers, not procurers? Healers, not hired guns?13 1
CP is moving the legal profession in that direction.

129. Brest & Krieger, supranote 24, at 529.
130. Macfarlane found that many lawyer CP proponents "have a highly litigious past."
MACFARLANE, supra note 25, at 6.

131.

Warren E. Burger, The State ofJustice, 70 A.B.A. J., May 1984, at 62, 66.
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